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The Illusion of Fairness Through
Special Committees in Management
Buyouts*
-

Shelby D. Green**

Special committees of corporate directors are in vogue as the instruments to ensure fairness in management buyouts of their companies.
Committees of directors, of course, are not new to corporate boards and
most large publicly-held corporations maintain standing committees to
handle a wide range of routine matters. Similarly, ad hoc or special committees have long-existed to address discrete, non-recurring questions.
But the use of special committees on management buyout proposals as a
response to questions of conflict of interest is excessive.
Consider the recent case of Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.
There, several members of the management of Macmillan proposed a
leveraged buyout of the company; a deal bringing shareholders billions of
dollars, but also bringing their elimination from the Macmillan enterp r i ~ e To
. ~ convince shareholders that this would be a fair deal, the board
As a 'safeguard' (the end of
set up a special committee of dire~tors.~
which should be obvious) the chairman of the board handpicked the
members.4 The chairman further offered the committee the able assistance and insight of the retained investment advisors that had crafted the
management buyout p r o p ~ s a l . ~

'

* Copyright O 1990 by Shelby D. Green.

**

Associate Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University, Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.; B.S., Towson State College,
Baltimore, Maryland.
1. 559 A.2d 1261 @el. 1989).
2. Id at 1265-66. In a leveraged buyout, the purchaser acquires the company's outstanding
stock from the shareholders. An investment banker arranges the transaction and the financing for
the purchase. Management stays in control of the company and eventually repays the debt to the
investors. The corporation's assets are normally used as collateral for the funds for the acquisition.
See Fradkin v. Emst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 833 @. Ohio 1976). In Macmillan, certain members of
management joined with the investment banking 6rm of Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts in the buyout.
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1264.
3. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1267.
4. Id at 1267.
5. Id at 1268.
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For a while it seemed as though the chairman's strategy would work
as the committee repeatedly rejected the bids of another suitor for the
~ o m p a n y .Even
~ when the other suitor bid $80 per share, all cash, and
the management team bid $64.15 ($52.35 in cash with the balance in
subordinated securities), the special committee was able to convince itself
that the management bid was higher.'
In the shareholder suit that followed the special committee's decision was condemned.' It must be clear that a committee so composed is
unlikely to reach a decision that is fair to shareholders. However, it
seems the issue is larger than the corruption of one committee. This case
exposes the inherent deficiencies of the 'special committee' device as a
treatment for conflict of interest problems.
This essay will explore these deficiencies and argue for real, and not
illusory, safeguards against directors' self-dealing in management
buyouts. Part I1 provides an overview of corporation law regarding the
decisionmaking authority of the board. Part I11 discusses self-dealing
transactions as exceptions to the normal judicial deference accorded
board decisions. Part IV discusses the flaws in the use of the special
committee to address conflict of interest problems. Part V provides an
analysis of the case introducing this essay and Part VI offers conclusions
and suggestions for reform.

In considering the role played by special committees in management
leveraged buyouts, some basic principles of corporate decisionmaking
should be stated. The relevant Delaware statute expresses the concept
well: "The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .''9 In exercising this discretion directors must use reason and act as ordinarily
prudent persons under similar circumstances, or be liable in damages to
It is not enough, though, that directors act without
the c~rporation.'~
0
-

6. Id at 1270-71.
7. Id. at 1271.
8. Id. at 1278.
9. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, 8 141(a) (1988). The corporation statutes of other states contain
similar wording. See REVISED
MODELBUSINESS
CORP.ACT 8 8.01(b) (1984): "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the
articles of incorporation." See also N.Y. BUS.CORP.LAW 5 701 (McKinney 1989): "[Tlhe business
of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors . . . ."
10. REVISEDMODELBUSINESS
CORP.ACT Q 8.30 (1984) provides:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as director, including his duties as a member of a
committee:
(1) in good faith;

Heinonline - - 18 W.

St.

U. L. Rev. 162 1990-1991

199OlSPECIAL COMMITTEES I N MANAGEMENT BUYOURT 163
negligence as the discretion and duty to manage demands the good faith
and honesty of directors. As Judge Cardozo once stated, "[nlot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is , . . the standard
of behavior" required of corporate fiduciaries." While these two fiduciary duties set the contours for management, the law nonetheless gives
directors a large measure of discretion in decisionmaking.
This position finds its true expression in the "business judgment
rule":
[A] court will not interfere with the judgment of the board of directors
unless there is a showing of gross and palpable overreaching. A board
of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment and its
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational
purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.'*

The rule constitutes a presumption that in making a business decision,
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company. l3
The policies underlying the business judgment rule were well-stated
in Auerbach v. Bennett:14
[Tlhe business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the
prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called
on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.
The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by
statute and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably
there can be no available objective standard by which the correctness
of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or
otherwise.l 5

Since directors cannot be expected to make competent and dynamic decisions if confronted each time with the certainty of hindsight, the rule
promotes efficiencyin corporate decisionmaking.16
Given the broad grant of authority to manage and the great deference to the directors' considered business judgment, it follows that the
board has the power to delegate specific authority to a committee of di(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
11. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E 545, 546 (1928).
12. Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 @el. 1971) (citation omitted). However, there is
no protection for directors who have made an "unintelligent or unadvised judgment." Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
13. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
14. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
15. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
16. See Johnson & Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigation Society, 15
VAL. U.L. REV.49, 54 (1980).
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rectors1' and that the business judgment rule should protect a decision of
that committee. l 8

The business judgment rule indeed affords directors wide latitude in
the operation of the enterprise, but it has only limited application in selfdealing transactions. At early common law transactions between corporate fiduciaries and the corporation were treated not with deference (as
would be the case if the business judgment rule were applicable) but by
great court scrutiny (as with the law of trusts).I9
Under the trust analogy managers who proposed self-dealing contracts had dual interests - their own and their interests as fiduciaries of
the corporation. Since both could not be served in the same decision it
was idle to demand sublimation of this conflict. The common law thus
demanded avoidance of these conflicts.20
Since self-dealing transactions, the clearest example of a conflict bethe rule of law
tween duty and self-interest, threaten the ~orporation,~'
17. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 141(c) (1988):
The board . . . may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1 or
more committees . . . . Any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of the
board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business and
affairs of the corporation . . . .
18. The decision by the board to delegate decisionmaking to a committee or to an outsider is
unquestionably a matter of business judgment. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 @el. 1986);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
19. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). The court explained:
While technically not trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years,
and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director. . . the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing hything that would work injury to
the corporation . . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest . . . . If
an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his duty . . . acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of the
corporation, at its election . . . . [This rule is] inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity

....

'I

See ahro Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1986).
AND MERGERS:NEGOTIATED
AND CONTESTEDTRANS20. Id. See S. LORNE,ACOUISITIONS
ACTIONS,§ lA.O2[2][a] (1989).
21. See Anderson, Conflictsof Interest: Eflciency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 738, 759-60 (1978). The-author stat&:
In a fiduciary relationship, the client or beneficiary depends on the fiduciary to an
unusual degree to determine for the client what his best interests are. Given this disparity
of experience, it would be extremely difficult and costly for the client to draft a detailed
contract defining the duties of fiduciary.
Fiduciary duties economize on transaction costs by simply obliging the fiduciary to act
in the best interests of his client or beneficiary and to refrain from self-interested behavior
not specifically allowed by the employment contract. They codify the reasonable expecta'

Heinonline - - 18 W. St. U. L. Rev. 164 1990-1991

1990lSPECIAL COMMITTEES IN MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS

165

that developed was that these transactions were disqualified not only
from the protection of the business judgment rule, but also were voidable
at the instance of the corporation or shareholders, without regard to the
fairness or unfairness of the transaction or the disinterestedness of the
directors who approved it.22 As one early case explains:
It is among the rudiments of the law that the same person cannot
act for himself and at the same time, with respect to the same matter,
as agent for another, whose interests are conflicting . . . The two positions impose different obligations, and their union would at once raise
a conflict between interest and duty; and 'constituted as humanity is, in
the majority of cases, duty would be overborne in the struggle'. . . .23

Modem corporation statutes reflect a recognition of a need to fashion different rules for this kind of fiduciary relationship and generally
permit such transactions. Statutes provide that self-dealing transactions
are not void or voidable solely because of the conflict of interest if the
transaction is: 1) disclosed and approved by a disinterested board; 2) disclosed and approved by the shareholders; or 3) is found to be fair to the
c o r p ~ r a t i o n .Despite
~~
their apparent breadth, conflict of interest stattions of the client, by obliging the fiduciary to do what the client would tell him to do if the
client had the same expertise as the fiduciary.

Id.

Ballantine points out that the early cases held, "[iln fiduciary relationships, . . . the one upon
whom the principal relies for representation and protection is not permitted to bargain with him at
arm's length or to set up immunity for sharp practices under a claim of the bargaining privilege of
caveat emptor." H. BALLANTINE,BALLANTINE
ON CORPORATIONS
167 (1946).
22. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? - ConJicr of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW.35,36-43 (1966); see a h Note, "Interested Director's" Contracts - Section 713 of the New York
Business Corporation Law and the "Fairness" Test, 41 FORDHAML. REV. 639, 640-41 (1973).
23. Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1880). Therefore, in Wardell, the court
held that it was improper for directors to make arrangements to secure an advantage for themselves
by the formation of a new company as an auxiliary to the original one, with an understanding that
they or some of them would take stock in it, and then that valuable contracts would be given to it.
Id.
This rigid prohibition against selfdealing seemed to have unquestionable validity in the trust
relationship where conservatism in the application of the trust res is the controlling principle and
trustee powers are in large measure derived from and limited by the trust instrument.
Corporate fiduciary relationships, however, seemed to require a more flexible approach. It was
Ballantine's theory that while directors are fiduciaries, they possess great, even original, power. H.
BALLANTINE,
supra note 21, at 4-5, 133, 167-68; see a h People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y.
194, 200-01, 94 N.E. 634 (1911); Hoyt v. Thompson's Executors, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859).
It has been argued that because the nature of the entity requires a certain dynamism in the
application of corporate resources, the rules governing trustees (guardians, executors or administrators, agents, partners, promoters) and directors should not necessarily coincide. Id. Ballantine
states further that although a high standard of loyalty must be demanded of directors, it might not
be wise policy to restrict them to the same extent as trustees and agents. Id. Indeed, some have
argued that selfdealing may be more beneficial than "comparable otherdealing, or market, transactions." R. CLARK,CORPORATELAW 164 (1986). Others have suggested that conflicts of interest
are the inevitable result of engaging in specialized exchange and since efficiency requires reliance on
the specialized production of goods and services and on an extensive system of exchange to make
goods and services available to those who need them, some conflicts of interest are unavoidable. See
Anderson, supra note 21, at 739.
24. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, 8 144 (1988) provides in part:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or
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utes do not repudiate entirely the common law's aversion to self-dealing

transaction^.^^
Indeed, it would be absurd to argue that legislatures, in relaxing the
rules on self-dealing, intended corporate fiduciaries to use these new rules
to accomplish naked freeze-outs of shareholders from the c o r p o r a t i ~ n . ~ ~
On the contrary, courts initially asserted continuingjurisdiction to evaluate the merits of self-dealing transactions with regard to fairnes~.~'One
court noted, "it would be a shocking concept of corporate morality to
hold that because the majority directors or stockholders disclose their
purposes and interest, they may strip the corporation of its assets to their
own financial advantage . . . ."28 This reaction seems to reflect the prevailing view that compliance with the disclosure and ratification provisions of these statutes merely "freshens the air" and removes the
"interested director
but the ultimate fairness of the transaction
must still be proved to the satisfaction of the court.30
officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, . . . shall be void or voidable
solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in
the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or
solely because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board
or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of
a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less
than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the
contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.
See also REVISEDMODELBUSINESSCORP. ACT 9 8.31 (1984). Thirty-eight corporate statutes have
provisions relating to self-interest contracts.
25. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 @.N.J. 1974); Remillard Brick Co.
v. Remillard-Dandi Co.,109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.M 66, 74 (1952).
26. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM.L. REV. 730, 730 (1985). The author
states:
The first management buyouts appeared about ten years ago. Then called "going private,"
most of those transactions involved small firms that had gone public in the hot new issue
market of the late 1960's and early 1970's . . . .
Though the supply of these small, "inadvertent" public companies has dried up since
the early 1970's, management buyouts are still with us. But while the basic conflict of
interest remains, management buyouts have in other respects changed considerably. . . .

....

Real economic and social gains from these buyouts are more difficult to find.

Id.
27. Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARV.L. REV.
335, 335-36 (1948).
28. Remillard Brick Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418-19, 241 P.2d at 73-74.
29. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,222 @el. 1976). Even with disclosure and approval it
is still incumbent upon the self-dealing director to demonstrate the intrinsic fairness of the transaction. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F . Supp. at 68.
30. However, in a recent case decided by the Delaware Supreme Court, Marciano v. Nakash,
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THE THREAT
THROUGH
THE SPECIAL
I . ERADICATING
COMMITTEE

Even under continuing judicial scrutiny these rules relieve some corporate fiduciaries of rigid common law restraints and give them the
means to redefine their relationship with shareholders and the corporation. Directors, top management and other fiduciaries can view themselves as co-venturers, entitled to share in the rewards of the enterpri~e.~'
The recent conduct of managers in leveraged buyouts show, though, that
these fiduciaries are not content with sharing, but would arrogate to
themselves the whole enterpri~e.'~
A board or committee decision to accept a management buyout proposal should be tested under conflict of interest principle^.^^ However,
some have proposed that management leveraged buyout proposals approved by special committees of disinterested directors should be
shielded from shareholder challenge by the business judgment rule.34
This proposition seems to hold that a special committee, with its formal535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987), some comments in dicta suggested that in certain cases a more preclusive
effect may result from compliance with the statute.
The court stated that disclosure and approval by the disinterested directors "permits invocation
of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of
proof upon the party attacking the transaction." Id. at 405 n.3. The case involved a challenge by a
50% shareholder to the corporation's repayment of loans made to the corporation by the other 50%
shareholder. The board of directors was hopelessly deadlocked and as such there was no disclosure
to the board nor approval of the loans by the disinterested members. Consequently, the burden of
proving fairness rested upon the selfdealing directors. Id. at 404-05.
31. See Vagts, The Leveraged Buyout and Management's Share, 25 WAKEFOR= L. REV.
129, 132 (1990).
32. Id. See e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882,885 (6th Cir. 1986): " M e conclude
on the basis of strong evidence that . . . [the] Board of Directors unreasonably preferred incumbent
management in the bidding process . . . [and] gave their colleagues on the Board, [as well as] . . .
'inside managers' preference in the negotiations, because of 'bias.' "
See also DeMon, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1988). The author states:
"In recent years the level of merger and acquisition activity in the United States has been
strikingly high, staggeringly so to some observers. . . . In 1986, 4,024 transactions with a
value of $190,512.3 million were completed, topping the prior record set in 1985 of 3,397,
valued at $144,283.5 million. . . . [B]y June 1987, wmpleted buyouts for the year totaled
$34.3 billion.
Id.
33. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee - Ensuring Business Judgment
Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions
Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAW.665, 666 (1988):
[C]ommittees allow a board to engage in an objective, disinterested examination of corporate issues in which some or all non-committee board members are interested parties. . . .Membership in these committees is limited to so-called "independent or
disinterested directors," who are free of any financial or other interests that would prevent
them from exercising objective, unbiased judgment.
34. Id. at 667. The author argues that in management buyouts and other conflict of interest
transactions "a special committee is helpful - if not invaluable - to ensure protection under the
business judgment rule." Id.
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ity and apparent detachment, removes from the transaction the odium of
self-interest.
Judging from the number of recent cases involving special committees used for this purpose, this proposition has many adherents among
the ranks of boards of directors.35 In the last several years numerous
corporate boards have taken comfort in apparent judicial approval of the
practice by setting up special committees to evaluate leveraged buyout
proposals.36 However, the special committee fails to accomplish the
hoped-for result - fairness. The deficiencies are as follows.
A.

Selection and Size of Committees

The most fundamental flaw in the selection process for members of
special committees is that there are no governing standards. While corporation statutes give the board authority to delegate authority to committees, the details of such delegation are left to the discretion of the
board.37 In the case of the usual standing committees, corporate boards
35. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), was one of the first cases to consider
the role of the special committee in leveraged buyouts. The proposed purchaser was the controlling
stockholder, Signal. Six of the thirteen UOP directors were elected by Signal and five of these were
either directors or employees of Signal. Id. at 704.
UOP's president, a director of both companies, negotiated on behalf of UOP although the negotiations were half-hearted at best. He mentioned the price on only one occasion and failed to disclose
a Signal study indicating a willingness to accept a price higher than that on the table. Id. at 707.
In the suit challenging the buyout, the court pointed to long-standing fiduciary principles that
dictated that the Signal designated directors on UOP's board owed UOP and its shareholders an
uncompromising duty of loyalty. The court stated:
When Directors of a . . . corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of fairness is udinching in its demand that where one stands on
both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, su5cient to
pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
That burden was not met in this case. There was no attempt to structure the transaction on an
arm's length basis. In a footnote the court ventured a view on the significance of an independent
committee in meeting the burden of proving fairness: "although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent
negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length." Id. at 709 n.7.
This single footnote has prompted much reliance and litigation. See, e.g., Memtt v. Colonial
Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. Ch. 1986); but see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.M 929,
938 @el. 1985).
36. See genemlly In re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig., 570 A.2d 259 (Del. 1990); Rabkin v.
Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.M 1099 (Del. 1985); In re Envirodyne Indus. Shareholders
Litig., No. 10702, slip. op. @el. Ch. Apr. 20, 1989), reprintedin 15 DEL. J. CORP.L. 175 (1990); In
re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10598, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (1989
WESTLAW 25812); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); In
re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. @el. Ch.Aug. 8, 1988), reprintedin 14
DEL. J. COUP. L. 699 (1989); Rosman v. Shoe-Town, No. 9483, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1988)
(1988 WL 3638); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., No. 9212, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987),
reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP.L. 651 (1988); In re Maxxam Group, Inc., No. 8636, slip. op. (Del.
Ch. Apr. 16, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP.L. 324 (1988); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d
1117 (Del. Ch. 1985); Patents Management Corp. v. O'Connor, No. 71 10, slip op. @el. Ch. June 10,
1985), reprinted in 11 DEL. J. COUP.L. 693 (1986).
37. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, 5 141(c) (Supp. 1988).
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can refer to history and industry practice for guidance in composing and
staffing ~ommittees.~'But the special committee in conflict of interest
cases makes its own way.3g Recent cases reveal no discernable patterns
or standards for the composition of such committees. In terms of size
there have been special committees of one,40 two4' and three directors.42
In other cases, directors become members of special committees by
default - they are the only ones who are not financially interested in the
Most often these are the outside direcmatter before the ~0mrnitte.e.~~
tors. However, the benefits derived from the objective disinterest of
outside directors may well be overshadowed by their limited knowledge
of the corporation's day-to-day affairs. Outside directors are almost always executives of other companies which demand their attentions and
leave little time to devote to the corporation's affairs.44 In recent years it
38. Simpson, supm note 33. "A board will generally rely on standing committees, such as
audit, compensation, and nominating committees, for recurring issues." Id. at 666. Indeed, the
existence of such committees may be a matter of statute. Id. at 666 n.3.
39. It is apparent that, as an ad hoc response to exigency, these committees can have little in
the way of tradition to aid them in setting their agenda. See genemlly Simpson, supm note 33.
40. Patents Management Corp. v. O'Connor, No. 71 10, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 10, 1985), reprinted in 11 DEL. J. COUP.L. 830 (1986) (a special committee composed of one outside, disinterested director and one executive officer of the corporation was appointed to consider a management
leveraged buyout).
41. I n re Trans World Airlines Shareholders Litig., No. 9844, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988),
reprinted in 14 DEL. J. COUP.L. 870 (1989) (a special committee composed of two board members
was appointed to consider a leveraged buyout); I n re Maxxam Group, Inc., No. 8636, slip op. (Del.
Ch. Apr. 16, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. COUP.L. 324 (1988) (special committee of two appointed
to consider merger with company controlled by directors); American General Corp. v. Texas Air
Corp., No. 8390, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 173 (1988) (a
special committee originally consisting of two outside directors was appointed to consider a merger
proposal and a newly added outside director subsequently joined the committee).
42. I n re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig., 570 A.2d 259 (Del. 1990) (special committee consisted of three directors, half the board); I n re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10598, slip op.
(Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (1989 WESTLAW 25812); Shingala v. Becor Western, Inc., Nos. 8858,
8859, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 7390); Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs.
Indus., No. 9212, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. COUP.L. 651 (1988)
(special committee was composed of three of the eleven member board).
43. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (special committee consisted of
the outside directors); Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 @el. 1985) (special
committee consisted of the outside directors); I n re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d
770, 773 (Del. Ch. 1988) (special committee consisted of all of the outside directors); but see I n re
Maxxam Group, Inc., No. 8676, slip op. (Del.Ch. Apr. 16, 1987) (1987 WESTLAW 10016) (special
committee of two where "[bloth men had been directors of Maxxam from a date preceding [the
merger proposal] and both appear[ed] to have experience and expertise in the field of mergers and
acquisitions").
44. See M. W C E , D r u ~ c r o ~M
s : m AND REALITY49,107 (1971); see also Mace, Directors:
Myth and R e o l i w T e n Years Loter, 32 RUTGEML. REV. 293 (1979). In his study of the boards of
publicly-held corporations, Mace found:
[clhief executives who serve other companies as directors are exceedingly busy men,
and their carefully budgeted time schedules cannot allow substantial diversions. Devoting
12 to 18 hours a year to the board problems of other companies does not permit any
perceptive and meaningful understanding of company problems. And to assume that company presidents - busy company presidents - will spend the time to do the homework
essential to understanding company problems is asking more than should be reasonably
expected. Their own stockholders would be short-changed if the president's time and energy were diverted to the problems of another company.
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has become increasingly clear that it is not even the inside directors who
manage the corporation, but senior e x e c ~ t i v e s . ~ ~
In terms of member incompetence, the selection process is both arbitrary and biased. While members of the board are selected in part because of their expertise in the particular industry, staffing decisions for
special committees ignore this relevant criteria and consider only the director's financial relationship to the matter to be decided.46

B.

Objective Disinterest

The cases reveal that some special committees are not even ostensia special
bly disinterested. In In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig~tion,~'
committee was appointed to consider a management leveraged
The buyout contemplated the purchase of stock owned by Ariadne,
which amounted to 49.5% of KDI.49 Seven of nine KDI directors were
Three of the committee members
appointed to the special corn~nittee.~~
were also shareholders of A~iadne.~'After certain members of the special committee expressed concern about the presence of the Ariadne
shareholding directors on the committee, the board reconstituted the special committee by making two of the three Ariadne shareholding directors alternates and retaining one as a regular member of the ~ommittee.'~
The special committee then unanimously recommended approval of the
buyout.53
The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of KDI, claimed the special
committee was tainted because its membership included a stockholder of
Ariadne and Ariadne stood to benefit most from the tran~action.'~Despite what appeared to be an obvious conflict of interest the court dismissed the complaint on these grounds:
M. MACE,supra, at 107. See ako M. EISENBERG,THE STRUCTURE
OF THE CORPORATION:
A
LEGALANALYSIS146 (1971).
45. Mace reported that, contrary to myth, the role of directors is largely advisory and not of a
decisionmaking nature, that management managed the company and board members served as
sources of advice and counsel to management. In most large and medium sized companies the
boards of directors did not establish objectives, strategies and policies. These roles were performed
by management. CEO's and directors interviewed generally agreed that only management can and
should have these responsibilities. M. MACE,supra note 44,at 47-49 &passim; see also M.EaENBERG,supra note 44, at 140. In fact, the language of the Delaware statute contemplates the delegation of executive functions: "The business and affairs of every corporation. . . shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors. . . ." DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, 8 141(a) (1988).
46. R. CLARK,supra note 24, at 645.
47. No. 10,278, slip. op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J . CORP.L. 759 (1989).
48. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J . CORP. L. at 761.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J . CORP. L. at 762.
52. Id.
53. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J . CORP.L. at 764.
54. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J . CORP.L. at 769.
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First, the record indicates that Ariadne was not willing to accept less
than fair value for its KDI stock . . . . Second, Ariadne has no financial interest in the merger in the sense of standing on both sides of the
transaction. Finally, Ariadne had only one representative on the Special Committee and there is no evidence that the Ariadne representative dominated or controlled the other disinterested members.5s

However, consider the decision in Greenfield v. National Medical
, ~ ~ a special committee was appointed to review and
Care, I ~ c .where
evaluate a management leveraged buyout propo~al.~'The committee
was composed of four director^.^^ Three of these had no financial interest in the matter.59 The fourth, Hager, was part of a group which would
own 25% of the common stock of the resulting c~rporation.~'Hager
was initially paid as a consultant to the board and subsequently asked to
join the board and allowed to purchase stock.61 Although Hager resigned, his resignation did not become effective until after the committee
recommended acceptance of the merger prop~sal.~'The court rejected a
defense motion to dismiss, ruling:
Although the complaint does not allege that there were any other bidders, it does allege that the merger price was unfair and that the lockup prevented the stockholders from obtaining a higher offer. When
combined with the allegations that the merger was approved by an
interested board and that one of the members of the special committee
was not independent, but did not resign until after the committee recommended the merger, I conclude that the complaint sufficiently states
a claim for breach of fiduciary

It is interesting that the same vice-chancellor decided both In re
KDI and Greenfield, yet the decisions seem irreconcilable. In both cases,
the same persons (the board of directors) proposing the buyout would
also decide the matter.64 Greenfield reflects the correct position that the
offense of a self-dealing transaction cannot be treated by a special committee that is itself tainted.6s
55. Id.
56. Nos. 7720 & 7765 (consolidated), slip op. (Del. Ch. June 6, 1986), reprinted in 12 DEL.J.
CORP.L. 737 (1987).
57. Id., reprinted in 12 DEL.J . CORP.L. at 741.
58. Id.
59. Id., reprinted in 12 DEL.J . CORP.L. at 742.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id., reprinted in 12 DEL.J . CORP.L. at 743.
63. Id.
64. In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10,278, slip op. @el. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988), reprinted
in 14 DEL.J . CORP.L. 759 (1989); Greenfied, Nos. 7720 & 7765 (consolidated), slip op., reprinted in
12 DEL.J . CORP.L. 737.
65. Moreover, "when the persons. . . who control the making of a transaction and the fixing of
its terms . . . are on both sides, then the presumption [of] and deference to sound business judgment
are no longer present." David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427,430-31 (Del. Ch.
1969).
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C. Structural Bias

The appointment of directors with no identifiable stake in a transaction before the committee is no guarantee of objective decisionmaking.
Even board members recognize the existence of more subtle forces that
may compromise a director's ~ b j e c t i v i t y .In
~ ~the selection of directors
generally, one scholar, Mace, found that chief executive officers specifically seek board members who are aligned philosophically and politically
with management.67 Among the desirable qualifications of candidates,
position, and title as leaders in their field are e ~ s e n t i a l .In
~ ~the special
committee cases chief executive officers assure a favorable outcome by
choosing friendly directors and by excluding those who may be adverse
or represent minority interests.69
66. In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10,278, slip op. @el. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988), reprinted
in 14 DEL. J . CORP. L. 759 (Del. Ch. 1989).
67. M. MACE,supra note 44, at 98-99, 196.
68. Id. Mace found that a director must "not be a controversial figure, and not be inclined to
stimulate controversy with the management or with the other outside directors." Id. at 98. Rather,
the director must be sympathetic to the management. Id. at 196.
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the B w r d m m :
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corpomte Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer, 1985, at 83, 85. The authors studied the special litigation committee and examined "several social-psychological mechanisms that can generate bias in the directors' assessment
of the suit, including biases established by appointment of members to the board or a special litigation committee, control of pecuniary or nonpecuniary rewards made available to the independent
directors by the defendant members of the board of directors, the independent directors' prior associations with the defendants, and their cultural and social heritages." Id. at 84-85. The authors
concluded that "these several psychological mechanisms can be expected to generate subtle, but
powerful, biases which result in the independent directors' reaching a decision insulating colleagues
on the board from legal sanctions." Id. at 85.
Eisenberg has suggested that these biases arise from various compositional elements. The most
striking is the degree to which the typical board includes persons who are economically or psychologically dependent upon or tied to the corporation's executives, particularly its chief executive:
Recent surveys suggest, for example, that approximately one-tifth to one-fourth of the
outside directors in large American corporations are lawyers or investment bankers. Probably most of these are suppliers of services to the corporations on whose boards they sit,
and are therefore highly interested in retaining the good graces of the chief executive, who
normally has control over the purchase of such services. These surveys also indicate that
approximately 12 to I5 percent of outside directors are commercial bankers, who are also
often intent on retaining the wrporation's business. Many if not most of the remaining
directors are psychologically tied to the chief executive by friendship, former colleagueship,
or both.
supra note 44, at 144-46. Eisenberg's treatment of the subject was based in part
M. EISENBERG,
upon Conference Board Surveys and two studies: HEIDRICK& STRUGGLES,PROFILEOF THE
BOARDOF DIRECTORS(1971) and KORN/FERRYINTERNATIONAL,
BOARDOF DIRECTORSANNUAL STUDY18 (1975).
69. Two examples illustrate the point. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261 @el. 1989), the chairman and chief executive officer who proposed a restructuring plan in
which senior management would end up with absolute majority control handpicked the committee
members and included a college classmate of his father as a member. In In re Ft. Howard Corp.
Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), repriirted in 14 DEL.J . CORP.L. 699
(1989), the chairman of the board, who proposed the buyout, selected the special committee. He met
with another director at an airport to ask the latter to serve as chairman and the two of them agreed
upon two others who "were best suited for the job." While the court declined to rule that such a
selection process amounted to bad faith, it did venture that "[ilt cannot . . . be the best practice to
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D. Deliberate Control Mechanisms
Structural biases are not the only corrupting elements at work in the
special committee. The integrity of the special committee's decision
making may be compromised by the deployment of deliberate control
mechanisms. A special committee, a creature of the board, has only the
authority the board has delegated." Limitations on the sphere of authorhave the interested CEO in effect handpick the members of the Special Committee . . . ." Id.,
L. at 720.
reprinted in 14 DEL. J. COUP.
Whether such structural biases should impeach a board decision has been debated (at least in
the shareholder litigation context and most often has been resolved in favor of the directors). See
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981); see also Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule
and shareholder Derivotive Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 BUS. LAW. 27 (1981); Cox, Searching for the
Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapat0 and ALZ Pmject, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 959; Elfin, An Evaluation of a New Trend in Corporate Law: Dismissal of Derivative Suits by
Minority Board Committees, 20 AM.BUS. L.J. 179 (1982); Note, A Proceduml Treatment of Derivative Suit Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69 CALIF.L.REv. 885 (1981); Note, Zopoto Corp. v. MaIdonado: Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule - A Ship without a Rudder?, 19 CAL. W.L.
REV. 189 (1982); Note, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule to Dismiss Shareholder
Derivotive Suits Againsr Directors, 33 U . FLA. L. REV. 589 (1981); Note, Special Litigation Committeex An Unwelcome Solution to Shareholders Demands, 1981 U . ILL. L. REV. 485.
However, there appears a trend away from automatic deference to these committees' decisions
on the basis that such structural bias is a significant factor affecting the integrity of a committee's
decision. The case of Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987), followed this movement.
The shareholders commenced a derivative suit alleging fraud, selfdealing and mismanagement by
certain directors. In response, the board appointed a special committee to investigate the allegations
and make recommendations on the proper course to follow. It recommended that two claims be
settled and all others dismissed. Acting in accordance with the recommendations, the board a p
proved a settlement covering the two claims and moved for summary judgment on the others.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the North Carolina Business Corporation Act
retlected a policy adopted by the legislature favoring minority shareholders and shareholders' derivative actions. As such, the statute precluded the termination of shareholder derivative actions without court approval. In this regard, the court would conduct an independent inquiry into the merits
of the recommendation to determine whether the directors by their special litigation committees had
met their burden of proof.
Further, the court noted:
[a] growing concern about the deficiencies inherent in a rule giving great deference to the
decisions of a corporate committee whose institutional symbiosis with the corporation necessarily affects its ability to render a decision that fairly considers the interests of plaintiffs
forced to bring suit on behalf of the corporation.
Id. at 469, 358 S.E.2d at 326.
In light of these deficiencies, the court refused a slavish application of the business judgment
rule. Instead, while the board may appoint a special litigation committee to decide whether to terminate a shareholder derivative suit, such a determination would not be binding upon the court. Instead, the court would make a fair assessment of the report of the special committee, along with all
the facts and circumstances in the case,in order to determine whether the directors will be able to
show that the transaction complained of was just and reasonable for the corporation. Accordingly,
the case was remanded in order for plaintiffs to
develop and present evidence on th[e] issue . . . that, in fact, false and/or incomplete information was supplied to the committee because of the nonadversarial way in which it gathered and evaluated information, and therefore . . . in light of these and other problems
which arise from the structural bias inherent in the use of board-appointed special litigation committees, that the committee's decision with respect to the litigation eviscerates
plaintiffs' opportunities as minority shareholders to vindicate their rights under North Carolina Law.
Id. at 473, 358 S.E.2d at 328.
70. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1988).
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ity delegated, the scope of the assignment and the flow of information to
the committee are devices that have successfully circumscribed the decision making of special committee^.^'

E. Delegation to Outside Advisors
While the common law limits on the power of the board to delegate
authority to executive committees of directors are not settled, the limits
of delegable duties are most clearly defined in cases involving outsiders.72
In order for such a delegation to be legally enforceable the delegation
must not involve surrender or abdication by the board of its statutory
duty to manage.73 Where the duties left to the board after delegation are
only unimportant, ministerial acts, the delegation is improper.74
Many committees studied here relied upon financial advisors to determine the fairness of an offering price.75 In several cases the special
71. In Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986), the special committee, composed of outside directors appointed to consider a management buyout proposal, failed to request
any comparative analysis of the management's proposal, read the pertinent document, or order fairness opinions and communicate with the principal of the proposing group. Nevertheless, the committee recommended the proposal. See id. at 885-86.
In Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Litig., 567 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Del. 1989), the special committee was
specifically directed not to engage in a search for alternative transactions to a management buyout
proposal.
In I n re Trans World Airlines, No. 9844, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL.
J. CORP.L. 870 (1989), the members of the two person special committee understood their responsibility to be very limited; that it did not include any negotiation with the merger offeror, that negotiation was the function of investment advisors and that it was not their intent to get the highest price
possible. The court stated:
[Tlhe special committee did not supply an acceptable surrogate for the energetic, informed
and aggressive negotiation that one would reasonably expect from an arm's-length adversary. . . . [Tlhe burden-shifting effect [of the business judgment rule] will not occur where
the special committee did not adequately understand its function - to aggressively seek to
promote and protect minority interests - or was not adequately informed about the fair
value of the firm and the minority shares in it.
Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J . CORP.L. at 884.
In Rosmon v. Shoe-Town, No. 9483, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 3638),
the special committee was asked to decide a management leveraged buyout proposal of a company
which had a history of going private, then public, then private again with little benefit to the investors. It appeared that several directors had been active participants in these maneuvers. The special
committee was instructed not to be concerned with price and the investment advisors hired by the
board never expressed an opinion on the price expected. In the court's view, the formality of setting
up a committee was only the beginning of the director's burden in such cases.
72. H. BALLANTINE,
supm note 21, at 134-35.
73. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 893 (1930).
74. Id. at 592. See o h Fournier v. Fournier, 479 A.2d 708, 712 (R.I. 1984) (too broad a
delegation, express or implied, may be interpreted as an unlawful abdication by the board of its
management functions); Lane v. Bogert, 116 N.J. Eq. 454, 174 A. 217 (1934) (while directors may
delegate they may not abdicate authority); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d
157, 173, 260 P.2d 823, 832-33 (1953) (while the board may grant authority to act it cannot delegate
its function to govern).
75. See, e.g., in re Envirodyne Indus. Shareholders Litig., No. 10702, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 20,
1989), reprinted in 15 DEL. J . CORP.L. 175 (1990); In re Trans World Airline Shareholders Litig.,
No. 9844, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP.L. 870 (Del. Ch. 1989).
See also DeMott, supra note 32, at 545. The author states:
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committee directed the advisors to negotiate the terms of the buyout.76
This complete reliance upon outside advisors to negotiate the terms of
the proposal, to determine the fairness of the offer and even to determine
whether to sell the corporation, seems a complete delegation of board
powers.
To be sure, the referral of some decisionmaking tasks to outsiders is
necessary in the evaluation of a tran~action.'~However, the ostensible
impartiality and detachment of outsiders meets neither the obligations of
directors nor the corporation's ends. Directors must be advocates, promoting the corporation, protecting its interests and refraining from conduct injurious to the c o r p ~ r a t i o n .As
~ ~agents or employees of the board
or committee, outside advisors serve and are accountable to their employers - the management that hired them.79 Their perspectives and
orientation are necessarily limited and skewed.'O
In a rough sense, the [fairness] opinion, if it is based upon a thoughtful assessment of
relevant non-public information about the wmpany, is a surrogate for full disclosure to
both the shareholders and the market generally, as a basis on which to assess the adequacy
of the price being offered. Although fairness opinions appear more rather than less credible
if the investment banker giving the opinion is not compensated on an outcomecontingent
basis, generally investment bankers' fees in this connection are larger if the opinion asserts
that the transaction is fair and smaller if the opinion asserts that the price offered is financially inadequate. "Inadequacy" or unfairness opinions cost less than "fairness" or adequacy opinions because part of the fee is in effect an insurance premium against the risk of
litigation against the investment bank. If the banker concludes that the proposed price is
inadequate, it is likely that either the transaction will not occur, or if it occurs, a higher
price will be offered. Non-transactions are inherently less conducive to litigation than
transactions, and thus require less of an insurance premium.

Id.
76. For example, in In re Trans World Airlines Shareholders Litig., No. 9844, slip op. (Del.
Ch. Oct 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. COUP.L. 870 (1989), the two members of the special
committee believed that negotiation was the task of the financial advisor.
In Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261 @el. 1989), only the financial advisors had direct contact with
the bidders. In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), the
board accepted without question the advice of its financial advisor that the prices offered were
"within the range of fair value," although the financial advisor had not in fact calculated a range of
fairness. Id. at 271.
77. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986).
78. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1955). The court stated:
[qulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or
fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others imposes upon a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of the type and under the circumstances present here.
Id. at 872.
79. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF AGENCY8 387 (1958): "Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters
connected with his agency."
80. See In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8,
1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J . COUP.L. 699 (1989). Out of fear that a temporarily depressed stock
price might render the company particularly vulnerable to a takeover attempt, senior management
met with the investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley for advice concerning possible steps to
protect shareholders from the perceived threat. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J . COUP.L. at 705-06.
Morgan Stanley had been engaged on a number of occasions in recent years to give investment
banking advice or services to the wmpany. The investment banker prepared a written report of
alternatives available including recapitalization, share repurchase, spin-off and a leveraged buy-out.
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V. ABUSEOF THE SPECIALC O M M I ~ EDEVICE
E
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. the forces of self-interest proved irresistible and revealed the pretensions of the special
committee.
In May 1987, certain members of senior management,82concluding
that Macmillan was a likely target of unsolicited takeover bids, "began
exploring various defensive measures, including a [complete] corporate
restructuring of the company."83 In all measures it was a central concept
that these same members of management would emerge with absolute
control of the company.84 Management's prediction of unsolicited bids
came true as they were confronted with a takeover proposal by Robert
M. Bass [Bass].85
Management began meetings with the investment banking firm of
Lazard, Freres & Co. [Lazard], which was later retained by the special
committee as its advisor.86 Previously, Lazard had advised senior management on other matters for over 500 hours. The special committee was
not told of Lazard's previous contractual relationship with management.87 The committee was further advised by the financial advisors,
Wasserstein, Perella [Wa~serstein].~~
Lazard valued the Macmillan stock at $72.57 per share on a pre-tax
basis, but advised the special committee directors that it found the restructuring price of $64.15 to be fair. Lazard also recommended rejection of the $64 Bass offer as "inadeq~ate."~~
"On the Special
Committee's recommendation, the Macmillan board adopted the management restructuring [plan] and rejected the Bass offer. The committee,
however, had not negotiated any aspect of the transaction with
Morgan Stanley indicated that it would be interested in participating with management in a leveraged buy-out. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP.
L. at 706. Their self-interest revealed, the report
might have been rejected or at least viewed with a measure of skepticism. Instead, management
teamed up with the corporation's long-time associate to pursue their mutual self-interest. Although
the court criticized the manner in which the special committee was selected, it nevertheless denied
relief. Id. at 718-27.
81. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
82. This group included the chairman, chief executive officer, president, chief operating officer,
and the chief financial officer. Id. at 1265.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Management decided in February o r March to establish a special committee to consider
management's restructuring plan to fend off Bass. Id. at 1267.
86. Id. at 1268.
87. Id. at 1267-68. In addition, Evans invited a law firm to attend and the committee retained
the firm. Id.
88. Id. at 1270.
89. Id. at 1270. Wasserstein valued Macmillan between $63 and $68 per share and also recommended rejecting the Bass offer. Id.
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Bass raised its bid to $73.91 Lazard advised the board that it could
furnish an "adequacy" opinion that would enable the special committee
to reject the Bass offer." Accordingly, Lazard concluded that the Bass
offer was inadequate, given Lazard's earlier opinion that the "pre-tax"
value of the company was between $72 and $80 per share.93 Wasserstein
concurred.94
Once again, on the special committee's recommendation, the board
rejected the revised Bass offer and reaffirmed its approval of the management restructuring plan.95 Management was unable to consummate the
transaction only because of a successful motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Bass.96
Undaunted, senior management then began extensive discussions
with Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts [KKR], investment bankers, in an attempt to develop defensive measures to thwart the Bass offer, including
discussions on a management-sponsored buyout of the ~ompany.~'Robert Maxwell [Maxwell] then entered the fray and proposed to the chairman a consensual merger between Macmillan and Maxwell at an all-cash
bid of $80 per share, which was $5 higher than any other outstanding
offer for the company.98
Although on May 30, both Wasserstein and Lazard had given opinions that the management restructuring plan, with a price of $64.15 per
share, was fair and on June 7, had advised the board that the company
had a maximum breakup value of $80 per share, they both issued revised
opinions on August 25, that an $80 per share offer was unfair and
inadeq~ate.~~
p~

-

-

-

90. Id.
91. Id. at 1271.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The vice-chancellor held both revised Bass offers "were clearly superior to the restructuring" and the only real threat posed by the Bass offers was to the incumbency of the board or to
the "management group's expectations of garnering a 39% ownership interest [in the company] on
extremely favorable terms." Id.
97. Id. at 1272.
98. Id. After more than three weeks of silence from the board, Maxwell made an $80 per share,
all-cash tender offer for Macmillan. Id.
99. Id. at 1272-73. Accordingly, the Maxwell bid was rejected. Macmillan and KKR met to
negotiate and finalize the management-sponsored buyout. At the same time Macmillan's financial
advisors were instructed by management to notify the remaining potential bidders to submit their
best and final bids within 2 days. Thereafter, in a meeting with Maxwell the chairman of Macmillan
announced that the company's management planned to recommend a management-KKR leveraged
buyout to the directors of Macmillan and that he would not consider Maxwell's outstanding offer
despite Maxwell's stated claim that he would pay "top dollar" for the entire company. The chairman stated further that he would only discuss the possible sale of up to $750 million worth of assets
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Several rounds of bidding followed.loo When the Maxwell all-cash
bid reached $89 and the KKR mixed bid $89.50 ($82 in cash and the
balance in subordinated securities), the two financial advisors concluded
that the offers were too close to call.1o1 On the last evening of bidding,
KKR submitted a final revised bid with a face value of $90 per share
(higher than the last Maxwell bid). lo' Both financial advisors agreed that
the KKR bid was higher and the special committee recommended acceptance of the KKR offer.lo3 The board adopted the r e s ~ l u t i o n . ' ~ ~
The result of this case was stated in the beginning of this essay. It
was clear from the record that the board's conduct failed all basic standards of fairness. The court held that although the board was aware of
its ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the auction, the
directors wholly delegated the creation and administration of the auction
to an array of the chairman's handpicked investment advisors.lo5 The
decisionmaking process was "clandestinely and impermissibly skewed"
in favor of the management-sponsored bid, which received significant
material advantages to the exclusion and detriment of other bidders in
order to "stymie, rather than enhance, the bidding process. 9,106 fie
to Maxwell in order to facilitate the management-sponsored buyout and that senior management
would leave the company if any other bidder prevailed over the management sponsored buyout offer.
During the bidding process and despite its repeated requests Maxwell was not given complete information until almost two months after such data had been furnished to KKR. Id. at 1273.
100. Id. at 1273-74.
101. At this point, the chairman called KKR and tipped Maxwell's bid. Id. at 1275. The committee set up procedures for a final round of bidding. Wasserstein prepared a "script" to be read
over the telephone to both bidders. While the prepared script was read to Maxwell, in the call to
KKR Wasserstein and other financial advisors impressed upon KKR "the need to go as high as
[KKR] could go" in terms of price. Id. at 1276.
102. Id. at 1276. While Macmillan continued to negotiate with both parties over different matters it never suggested to Maxwell that KKR had topped Maxwell's last bid. Id.
In turn for raising its bid to $90.05 KKR succeeded in winning other important concessions
from Macmillan including the sale to KKR of certain assets which would immediately result in a
$250 million current tax liability for Macmillan. This liability could have been avoided through an
installment basis sale of the assets, but as structured it operated as a de facto poison pill. Id. at 1277.
103. Id. at 1277.
104. Id. at 1277-78. On the same day Robert Maxwell delivered a letter to Evans announcing
that he had amended his cash tender offer to $90.25 per share, conditioned upon invalidation of the
KKR lockup agreement. In his letter Maxwell emphasized that he had previously stated his willingness to top any offer higher than his earlier $89 offer. Id.
On October 4, the Macmillan board met to consider both the revised Maxwell bid and Evans'
"tip" to KKR. After some discussion and deliberation the board rejected Maxwell's increased offer
because it was conditioned on invalidating the KKR lockup. Furthermore, the board considered
that the "tip" to KKR was immaterial in light of the second round of bidding that occurred. In
addition, after consultation with counsel, the board concluded that their ignorance of this "tip" at
the time they approved the merger with KKR was insufficient grounds for repudiating the lockup
agreement. Id. at 1278.
105. Id. at 1281.
106. Id. In particular, the "negotiations" with Maxwell were noteworthy only for the peremp
tory and curt attitude of Macmillan through its chairman. Maxwell was deliberately misled by the
advisors and subjected to a series of short bidding deadlines in a seeming effort to prevent the submission of a meaningful bid. Id. at 1281-82.
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court concluded:
Normally decisions of a board based upon [opinions or reports of officers and other experts selected with reasonable care] will not be disturbed when made in the proper exercise of business judgment.
However, when a board is deceived by those who will gain from such
misconduct, the protections girding the decision itself vanish. Decisions made on such a basis are voidable at the behest of innocent parties to whom a fiduciary duty was owed and breached, and whose
interests were thereby materially and adversely affected.'''
This rule
is based on the unyielding principle that corporate fiduciaries shall abjure every temptation for personal profit at the expense of those they
serve. lo8

This ruling seems to answer the central inquiry of this paper - constituted as humanity is, the special committee fails as a device to ensure a
proper resolution of a conflict between duty and self-interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Macmillan, the court found that because the proponents of the
management buyout had failed to disclose all relevant information and
had engaged in other acts in a deliberate attempt to thwart the board's
duty to enhance shareholder wealth, the decision was disqualified from
the normal standards of deference due under the business judgment
rule.lW It seems that the result in this case was correct, but the stated
issue too narrow. The real issue needing resolution was whether, as a
general proposition, special committees are fit to treat transactions
tainted with self-interest. The cases reveal inherent deficiencies in the
selection and composition of members such that honest, dispassionate
decisionmaking is impossible. Even when committee members are otherwise well-meaning, the cases show they can be hoodwinked by a determined group of self-dealing managers. It is little comfort that some
courts, such as the Macmillan court, eventually vindicate the rights of
107. The court explained:
In this context, we speak only of the traditional concept of protecting the decision itself,
sometimes referred to as the business judgment doctrine. The question of the independent
directors' personal liability for these challenged decisions, reached under circumstances
born of the board's lack of oversight, is not the issue here. However, we entertain no doubt
that this board's virtual abandonment of its oversight function in the face of [the management bidders'] patent self-interest was a breach of its fundamental duties of loyalty and
care in the conduct of this auction . . . ."
Id. at 1284 n.32 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 1284. The court went on to discuss whether the directors' had met their "enhanced
duty" of loyalty in responding to a potential shift in control and whether the lockup agreement was
valid. The duty was not met and the decision of the directors granting the lockup option was neither
informed nor disinterested. As such, it was not protected by the business judgment rule. Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 1287-88.
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shareholders because interim costs (corporate resources used to plan, effectuate and defend the appropriation) are great and irretrievable. Moreover, there is a more fundamental cost in the loss of shareholder control.
In these schemes, the power to decide on actions which will bring about
irrevocable consequences is removed from persons loyal to the enterprise
and given to those who have subordinated themselves to their own selfinterest or to outsiders who have never pledged any loyalty to the corporation or the shareholders. The locus of corporate decisionmaking thus
shifts. In that shift, shareholders are wholly excluded from the corporate
process.
In normal business decisions directors have discretion and their
honest and informed judgments require deference. Self-dealing transactions, however, warrant greater court scrutiny. While a standard method
for evaluating such transactions may facilitate intelligent adjudications, a
set of procedures which ensures only a cursory review of self-dealing
transactions as to procedural fairness only encourages management compromise. As long as the use of the special committee can be set up as
conclusive (or even rebuttable) evidence of fairness, a director need not
avoid plans which conflict with the interests of the corporation. Instead,
he will find it profitable to curb his ideas, energies and commitment until
shareholders have been eliminated and the corporation is his alone. Indeed, his office as a fiduciary affords him the means - information, financial resources and business relationships - by which to accomplish
his coup (not only in practical aspects, but in sustaining his burden during a challenge in ~ o u r t ) . ' 'To
~ accord business judgment rule protection
to a decision by a corporation's fiduciaries in these situations seems
perverse.
It is necessary to import substantive considerations into the evaluation of conflict of interest questions. This can be accomplished by allowing directors no choice between self-interest and duty. An absolute
rule prohibiting directors from proposing self-interested buyouts is
required. '
110. See genemlly Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALEL.J.
1354 (1978).
111. This writer is not the first to call for an absolute prohibition on management buyouts. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 110, at 1367-68, 1376 (advocating prohibition on all going private
transactions).
See also Demott, supra note 32. The author considers the various policy alternatives for addressing management buyouts including absolute prohibition. She argues that while a categorical
ban presents serious problems of definition, "[i]f the principle interest to be served by the directors is
that of the company's shareholders, directors should not be free to ensure that the transaction sponsored by management and its allies will trump competing bids." Id. at 554. DeMott proposes permitting management groups to bid, but restricted from structuring any such transaction so that
public equity is entirely eliminated. Id. at 555. In addition, she proposes that there be a requirement
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that the fact of the management proposal be publicly announced coupled with a requirement that
non-public information equivalent to that given the management group be made available to other
prospective bidders, who could in turn be required to agree to treat the information received as
confidential. Id. at 556.
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